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Conservation auctions have received increased attention since the turn of the century.  Improved 
management of forests for biodiversity is one of the areas where this has been the case.  Previous 
studies have to my knowledge not accounted for the impact of timber price variability on forest 
owners’ bidding behavior.  This thesis fills this void in the literature. 
 
Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) showed that timber price fluctuations affect the timing of timber cutting 
as the forest owners' reservation prices for cutting increase under higher price variability.  A basic 
insight from auction theory is that no bidder will submit a bid that makes him or her worse off.  This 
is also the case for conservation contract auctions. 
 
I combine the above two insights to show that bids for forest conservation auctions will become higher 
under timber price variability compared to cases with timber prices without such fluctuations. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
Biodiversity is a source of numerous benefits to mankind. We depend on biodiversity in 
ecosystems for provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating services 
related to climate, floods, diseases, wastes, and water quality; cultural services such as recreation, 
aesthetic enjoyment, and spiritual fulfillment; and supporting services such as soil formation, 
photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling (MEA, 2005).  The rate of biodiversity loss at a time when 
our knowledge of its importance has grown immensely, has made many concerned, leading to 
efforts to preserve biodiversity. 
Scarcity of public funds and resources make it imperative to use cost effective ways of controlling 
biodiversity losses. Cost effectiveness is a necessary condition for maximizing benefits from the 
use of public funds. A cost-effective biodiversity policy requires identifying which service 
providers have management strategies that are least cost.  
Well-designed procurement auctions have been identified as potentially cost-effective for 
engaging biodiversity management services from potential suppliers. Uniform-price auctions 
based on Vickery (1961) have been regarded (Romstad, et al, ibid.) as an instrument which can 
potentially resolve the double matching problem. It is expected to allocate conservation contracts 
to least-cost providers and lowers the compensation payments needed for landowners to 
voluntarily accept changes in their forest management practices.  
 
Owners of private forestland set out to get the most value out of their lands. They make decisions 
with the goal of maximizing net returns from their assets, in our context, their forestland. As 
rational economic agents, they will participate and comply with biodiversity management 
contracts if they expect that their pay-off under conservation is equal to or more than other 
alternative uses of their lands. What bids can be expected from landowners in forest biodiversity 
auctions when the next best alternative value is the return from forestry business as usual? 
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Forest biodiversity management is such that the buyer cannot monitor seller completely. When the 
agent expects significant positive net returns from non-compliance, the agent´s probability not 
comply increases and when the agent expects a negative return on non-compliance, compliance 
probability tends to increase, holding penalty and monitoring constant (Shavell, 1987; Mitchell & 
Shavell, 2000). This means that the design of any cost-effective instrument for payment of 
ecosystem services generally and auction as a specific instrument of interest in this thesis, must be 
cognizant of these issues. 
 
Auctions that are designed to elicit truthful revelation of agents´ potential net returns on non-
compliance provides reliable information about the value of not meeting contract obligations and 
hence enabling award of contracts to least cost service providers. This information can be used to 
improve the effectiveness of monitoring as well as minimizes cost of monitoring (Romstad & 
Alfnes, 2011).  
 
1.2 Optimal harvest timing, the Hotelling rule and bid formation 
Landowners seek to maximize net returns from their land. This implies that returns from forest 
biodiversity management contracts must at least be equal to the returns from other uses of their 
land. Timber harvesting times are flexible to some extent. This allows landowners a space of time 
to cut a tree stand a few years earlier or later than the planned harvest time to benefit from an 
expected local peak in the timber price. When a tree stand is near ready to harvest, foresters aim 
for harvesting at local price peaks in order to maximize revenues.  
The implication of this framing for bid formation is that landowners will aim to bid to the level at 
which they are indifferent between net present value of returns from conservation and harvesting. 
Thus, bidders will aim to bid to the extent that opportunity value per unit of harvest (evaluated at 
the time of bidding) are consistent with local peak prices overtime when forming bids. This 
valuation is affected by price uncertainty and oscillation arising from unpredictable market forces. 
This also implies that the opportunity income is at an expected local peak, i.e., above the mean 
price line. Thus, the optimal harvest time is a reference point for bid formation and opportunity to 
practice flexible price harvesting is important for bid formation.  
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Figure 1.1: Hypothetical annual prices of timber showing fluctuations from one period to another 
 
Source: Author´s Design. Remark: Add NOK 400 to the figure scale to get prices matching typical 
Norwegian timber prices for spruce per cubic meter. 
Figure 1.1 shows hypothetical plot of annual price level of timber within a 12-year period of 
biological maturity. The 12-year time window is chosen for simplicity – the length of the time 
window varies depending on the type of forest. It is within this period that forest owners consider 
harvesting. Harvesting at an earlier time is unlikely to be optimal because the trees are still growing 
at a higher rate and increasing potential timber volume and forest value relative to returns on the 
present value of existing forest value. Beyond period 12, the landowner keeps the trees standing 
at a relatively higher opportunity cost as the tree volume growth is below the risk-free interest rate. 
This means that landowners will maximize forest value with this period depending on the price 
level at which he/she cuts, given constant interest rate and cutting cost (planting costs has already 
been incurred at the time the forest was planted). 
We can observe price fluctuations over the period from NOK 418 per cubic meter of timber in 
period 1 to as high as NOK 475 per unit in period 12. Three local peaks occurred over the period 
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mean price over the period. Line CD gives the price level landowners will try to aim for as they 
make the cut or wait decision. Given the flexible nature of harvest Brazee and Mendelsohn (1988) 
have shown that landowner stand to benefit for these random fluctuations in price if they 
implement a flexible price harvesting strategy. 
 
 Timber revenues are a function of prices times harvest volume. Hence, waiting for a higher price 
may be a beneficial strategy, not only because it improves targeting for a maximum price, but it 
may also generate benefits from increased volumes as long as the forest grows at a good pace. This 
implies that waiting for higher prices may come with benefits of a higher volume. Conversely, if 
the forest owner expects lower prices for a prolonged period, he or she may choose to harvest a 
few years early.  This brings about an extra benefit – earlier arrival of revenues at the cost of a 
slightly lower tree harvest volume. For instance, from figure 1.1, assuming the Faustmann optimal 
rotation age coincides with period 7, a landowner may decide to cut earlier in periods 3, or 6, or 
later in period 10 through a flexible price harvest strategy and benefit from the respective price 
peaks that exists in such period. 
 
There is a cost of waiting. Timber revenues arrive on the day the forest is harvested. Waiting 
implies forgoing all interests on forest value with could have accrued to the landowner had he/she 
cut earlier and deposited the money in a bank. In addition, waiting pushes forward the next 
replanting period. This implies a loss of some interest on the site value of land.  
 
In a similar framework, the landowner bidding in a forest biodiversity auction is expected to use 
information about the potential gains from flexible price harvest during bid formation. In 
evaluating his/her opportunity value, the bidder will aim to maximize the present value of the 
expected profits from the forest based on an expected price higher than the mean price. This thesis 
tries to show this tendency by modelling the expected bids of forest owner in a N+1 price 
conservation auction when their opportunity value arises from expected returns from the forest 
industry and random price fluctuation exist   
 
It is expected that landowner´s bid N+1 price auction is equal to the opportunity value of the land. 
With these perspectives, one could argue that logging decisions and the bidding decisions in 
conservation contracts are similar.  Unfortunately, there has been so few auctioned conservation 
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contracts out there that produce data suitable to econometrically test if there are similarities. This 
study therefore explores in a theoretical analysis the implications of optimal harvest timing in an 
environment of uncertain timber prices and flexible harvesting in bid formation.  
 
1.3 Conceptual framework  
The study is based on a conceptual framing of a rational forest owner trying to maximize net 
returns on their forest when subjectively valuing their opportunity value in a forest biodiversity 
auction bid formation.  This framework is deemed similar in context to a landowner choosing an 
optimal rotation age that maximize dynamic efficiency in an infinite rotation forest model. This 
landowner has a problem of deciding subjectively, his/her opportunity value in order to maximize 
returns from conservation. This is just like the satisfying the dynamic efficiency condition. The 
optimal harvest time that maximizes expected revenue from the stand is important in the forest 
owner´s subjective valuation of opportunity value in bid formation in order for to maximize net 
returns from conservation. This is relevant for evaluating true opportunity cost for the landowner, 
identification of least cost providers for the buyer and the design of effective monitoring strategy 
for biodiversity management auction.   
 
Price uncertainties during the harvest periods and flexibility in harvest timing enable landowners 
to implement a flexible price-harvest strategy (Brazee & Mendelsohn, 1988) in order to maximize 
the value of their harvest. This achieved by waiting for a stumpage price that is greater than the 
forest owner´s reservation price when he/she expects higher prices. On the other hand, the 








1.4 Objectives and research questions 
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the impact of inherent price uncertainty and flexible 
harvesting associated with forest biodiversity conservation on bidding behavior in N+1 price 
conservation auction.  
Objectives:  
1. To explore how timber price uncertainty, affect agents bid formation in N+1 price Forest 
biodiversity auctions;  
2. To explore some implications of timber price uncertainty relevant aspects of N+1 price 
conservation auction design and implementation. 
 
1.5 Method of study 
I conduct a decision analysis based on a dynamic model that reflect the behavior of a rational 
landowner maximizing net revenue from forest land use in conservation auction when alternative 
value arises from timber production in a context of price uncertainty. Assuming a single uniform 
stand model of forest in the context of a dynamic forest, I demonstrate the sequential decision 
process as similar to a cut or wait decision in forest industry business as usual in the context of 
fluctuation timber prices and flexible harvesting. I then explore implications of price uncertainty 
and harvest in a conserve or harvest decision context.  
 
1.6 A brief outline of the rest of the thesis 
In chapter two I review some relevant literature on key aspects of the thesis. I continue with the 
method of study and the model used in the study under chapter three. Chapter four comprises a 
decision analysis conducted based on the model and using chosen parameter values for history 
data in the forest industry in Norway. In chapter five in discuss the findings of the analysis in 
relation to N+1 price auction design and implementation. Chapter six presents the summary 







Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I review some of the relevant literature for my thesis on biodiversity conservation.  
Please recall my problem statement on the implications of price uncertainty on the formulation of 
bids in procurement auctions related to the optimal harvesting rule of Brazee and Mendelsohn 
(1988).  I will not discuss this issue further in this chapter as I will return to that in chapter three.  
Now, I look at the broader background on biodiversity conservation and relevant economic 
policies, including auctions. 
  
The societal objective of environmental sustainability under which biodiversity conservation goals 
arise, fall within the mandate of political authorities. They decide the goals and have a 
responsibility to use cost effective mechanisms to attain them. In Norway, the objective as 
indicated in the Nature Diversity Act, chapter one, section one, is “to maintain the diversity of 
habitat types within their natural range and the species diversity and ecological processes that are 
characteristic of each habitat type” (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2009).  
 
The cost-effectiveness of policy mechanisms aimed at meeting environmental goals and 
particularly biodiversity conservation targets, requires careful consideration of relevant principles 
and contextual issues. Such policies should be designed with reasonable certainty of reaching 
stated goals. The forest industry competes with forest biodiversity for land use to a large extent.  
As mentioned in the introduction this thesis explores how the price uncertainty in the forest 
industry may impact bid formation in auctions designed to elicit truthful revelation of sellers´ 
opportunity value. In this chapter I first review some relevant literature on forest biodiversity 
management issues including design considerations for cost effectiveness. I continue the literature 
review with a focus on the applicability of procurement auction in addressing some of these 
concerns.  
 
2.1 Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services  
The ecological concept of biodiversity is inherently complex there exist a large number of 
competing biodiversity definitions and an even larger number of measures (DeLong 1996). 
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According to Delong (1996, p. 745) “Biodiversity is an attribute of an area and specifically refers 
to the variety within and among living organisms, assemblages of living organisms, biotic 
communities, and biotic processes, whether naturally occurring or modified by humans”. He adds 
that it can be observed and measured at any spatial scale ranging from microsites and habitat 
patches to the entire biosphere. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005) defines 
biodiversity as the variability among living organisms from all sources including terrestrial, marine 
and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part.   
 
In connection with human wellbeing, biodiversity forms the basis for complex ecosystems that 
provides humans with “ecosystem services”, defined by the Daily & Dasgupta (2005, p. 353) as “ 
the wide array of conditions and processes through which ecosystems and their biodiversity 
confers benefit on humanity, these include the production of goods, life-support functions, life-
fulfilling conditions and preservation of options”.  The benefits people obtain from ecosystems 
include provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating such as the 
regulation of climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services such as 
recreation, aesthetic enjoyment, and spiritual fulfillment; and supporting services such as soil 
formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling (MEA, 2005).   
 
Barthkowski (2016) summarizes the literature on the economic value of biodiversity, identifying 
four sources: biodiversity contributes to ecosystem functioning (insurance value), is the carrier of 
future options (option value), provides ‘efficient’ support for migrating species (spill-over value) 
and influences the aesthetic appreciation of ecosystems (aesthetic value). Being only a property of 
ecosystems, biodiversity does not have value per se, but only contributes to the overall value of an 
ecosystem (Barthkowski, ibid.). 
  
It is estimated that the value of ecosystem services (e.g. organic waste disposal, soil formation, 
bioremediation, nitrogen fixation and biocontrol) provided each year in agricultural systems 
worldwide may exceed US$ 1542 billion (reference – is it Sumila et al., 2018? – if so, add it here). 
About 100 000 species of insects as well as birds and mammals pollinate more than two-thirds of 
food plants. Pollinators have been found to be worth more than US$ 200 billion per year to the 
global food economy, which amounts to 9.5% of the total value of the world’s agricultural food 
production (Sumaila, et al., 2018). 
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Brockerhoff et al. (2017) review forest ecosystem services including biomass production, habitat 
provisioning services, pollination, seed dispersal, resistance to windstorms, fire regulation and 
mitigation, pest regulation of native and invading insects, carbon sequestration and cultural 
ecosystem services based on forest type, structure and diversity. Part of their findings was that 
published studies were lacking in empirical studies that establishes quantitative and causal 
relationship between forest biodiversity and many important ecosystem services. They indicated 
that pressure from human activities have led to forest loss, fragmentation and degradation which 
have cost us much biodiversity decline and homogenization (Brockerhoff, et al., ibid.). Their 
review identified some mechanisms such as niche complementarity in time and space, 
complementary functional effect traits and functional response traits and facilitation among plant 
species growing together, to be ways in which forest biodiversity is suspected to relate to 
ecosystems services supply and acknowledges that there is still considerable uncertainty about the 
extent of a `functional relationship` between biodiversity and the provision of ecosystem services.    
 
2.2 Concerns about biodiversity loss  
The Convention on Biological Diversity defines biodiversity loss as “the long-term or permanent 
qualitative or quantitative reduction in components of biodiversity and their potential to provide 
goods and services, to be measured at global, regional and national levels (Brockerhoff, et al., 
2017. p.2). Globally factors such as continued expansion of the human population leading to 
increased exploitation of natural resources, pollution, land-use change and climate change underly 
biodiversity loss. For all aspects of biodiversity, current pace of change and loss is hundreds of 
times faster than previously in recorded history and the pace shows no indication of slowing down 
(Brooker, et al., 2007). 
 
MEA (2005) reported that virtually all of Earth's ecosystems have been dramatically transformed 
through human actions, for example, 35% of mangrove and 20% of coral reef areas have been lost. 
More than half of the 14 biomes that was assessed have experienced a 20–50% conversion to 
human use, with temperate and Mediterranean forests and temperate grasslands being the most 
affected (approximately three quarters of these biome’s native habitat has been replaced by 
cultivated lands). In the last 50 years, rates of conversion have been highest in tropical and sub-
tropical dry forests. “The overwhelming evidence of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy 
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Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) Global Assessment, from a wide range 
of different fields of knowledge, presents an ominous picture,” said IPBES Chair, Sir Robert 
Watson (United Nations, 2019).  In Norway, 2355 species have been classified as threatened. This 
corresponds to 11.3 % of the approximately 21 000 species that were assessed (Norwegian 
Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2015). 
 
Concerns over the accelerated rate of loss of biodiversity have been growing even as our scientific 
knowledge on the importance of biodiversity has increased. Some of the literature (Brockerhoff, 
et al., 2017;Bartkowski, 2016; Augustyncziket et al, 2019) shows that the primary threats to 
biodiversity are habitat fragmentation, overexploitation of resources, the invasion of exotic species 
and chain extinctions resulting from these factors. Climate change is currently an important factor 
as it destabilizes natural environment even more. Romstad, et al. (2012) argues that this is partly 
due to the failure to identify and implement cost effective policies for managing habitats and 
protecting threatened species.  
 
Global vision to improve biodiversity loss is captured in the Aichi Biodiversity Targets and the 
Convention on biodiversity´s Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011- 2020.  These international 
efforts translate into respective biodiversity conservation management procurement at the national 
and subnational levels. Forest biodiversity management services are undertaken to achieve forest 
biodiversity goals as part of the larger effort towards nationally determined conservation policy 
goals. Norway considers biodiversity conservation essential to her long-term goal of becoming a 
greener society (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2015). The objective is to 
maintain the diversity of habitat types within their natural range and the species diversity and 
ecological processes that are characteristic of each habitat type and maintain ecosystem structure, 
functioning and productivity to the extent this is considered to be reasonable. (Norwegian Ministry 
of the Environment, 2009). 
 
2.3 Challenges with existing Forest biodiversity conservation management policy regimes 
 A number of challenges to achieving biodiversity targets have been identified in the literature. 
Sironena, et al. (2020) make the point that conservation decisions have implications for different 
stakeholders and typically draw on multidisciplinary knowledge bases, incorporating natural, 
physical and social sciences, politics and ethics. This imposes a heavy information requirement on 
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policy making process.  They indicate that uncertainties relating to relationship between 
biodiversity and various ecosystem services is a crucial limitation to efforts on evaluating the 
economic value of biodiversity conservation and the impact of biodiversity loss in policy making.  
 
Basquill et al. (2016), state that there exists “no common ecological standard for producing and 
summarizing current land cover conditions. This inconsistency makes it difficult to ensure 
landscape and natural resource assessments are comparable across management units, regions, or 
between government and non-governmental partners”. Biodiversity conservation decisions are 
multifaceted and are further aggravated in a context where deterioration of biodiversity has 
resulted from an intensive management practice by hundreds of thousands of forest owners, who 
have operated under different conservation policy instruments (Sironena, et al., 2020). 
 
Uncertainties arising from incomplete information about functional relationship biodiversity 
between ecosystem services and also the complications introduced by climate change on the 
dynamics of both forest and forest biota (Augustynczik et al., 2019). Climate change is expected 
to modify a variety of forest processes and interactions, e.g. forest growth rates, species 
composition and disturbance activity (Lindner et al., 2014). 
 
Romstad et al. (2012) indicate that conflicts between landowners and the regulatory agency on 
issues of compensation is a major concern. Vatn et al. (2005) identify four forms of conflicts in 
this amount biodiversity management actors; Conflict of value – conflicts involving disagreement 
about which values are involved, Conflict of facts or data – conflicts that are characterized by 
disagreement about cause-effect relationships, technical questions, Conflict of interest – conflicts 
that can be characterized by agreement with respect to facts and values involved, but disagreement 
with respect to allocation of costs and gains and Conflict of rights – conflicts that involve different 
realizations of the prevailing legal rights or what rights that should prevail. 
 
For Bergseng & Vatn, (2009), such conflicts arise because the changes in forest management 
practices entails extra costs on most existing users of forests. To a large extent all these conflicts 
can be partly attributed to the levels of uncertainty and information asymmetry that surrounds 
biodiversity management procurement, a state of affairs that both the buyer (the environmental 
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protection agencies) and the seller (the landowner) have reason to exploit. Theoretically, the buyer 
seeks to be cost effective and the seller seeks to maximize economic returns. 
These conflicts partly fuel sentiments among landowners that they are not being fully or fairly 
compensated for their service to society. For example, Norway is noted to have a relatively higher 
conflict level compared to other Nordic countries. This has been found to be due in part to 
landowners receiving a smaller fraction of full compensation than in other Nordic countries 
(Romstad et al, 2012). When landowners feel inadequately compensated, they will not be 
motivated to voluntary participate in the intervention as they perceive that they will be made 
worse-off.  This will undermine the attainment of policy objectives. Another implication is that 
the unit cost to society for forest biodiversity conservation will be higher on landowners as 
compared to the rest of society. One more implication of this sentiment is that, post-contract 
compliance probability may fall when new information confirms their suspicions.  
 
2.4 Forest Biodiversity as a public good 
Property rights to forests are often clearly defined or can be allocated through the market at 
reasonable level of transaction cost. Land (forest) may be either be owned by the state, local 
community or privately owned. However, forest biodiversity, which is a characteristic of the forest 
Delong (1996), does not lend itself easily to clear property right allocation. Thus, even though 
more biologically diverse forest has known benefits to society, access to it is to a large extent non-
rivalry and non-exclusiveness, making it a public good. This means that the market will failure to 
generate the socially optimal level of output.  
 
2.5 Forest Biodiversity Conservation Management through Payment of Ecosystem Services 
As a public good, and with government’s social welfare maximization goal in mind, various 
instruments have been developed by economists to pay for ecosystem services, known as Payments 
for ecosystem services (PES) (Engela, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008). Direct regulation, also known 
as command-and-control, have been used where applicable but have been with its challenges such 
as political feasibility issues, administrative costs, information limitations and other constraints 
(Engela  et al., ibid). 
   
 21 
In the literature, PES have become increasingly preferred by economists and political authorities 
due to their potential to delivery least cost results and also other attributes like their voluntary 
nature of participation, being incentive-based, flexible and dynamic efficiency. Centrally designed 
forest biodiversity conservation policy has generated severe conflicts during the 1990s, therefore 
the current approach to conservation is primarily voluntary and reliant on economic incentives 
(Primmer, et al., 2015). 
 
2.6 Cost effectiveness and Biodiversity management 
Being cost effective means adopting policy instruments that achieves a policy target at the least 
cost (Perman et al., 2011).  Thus, a cost-effective policy instrument has the minimum opportunity 
cost. Socially optimal use of resources requires that agents maximize the net social benefit of the 
use of available resources or minimize the cost of meeting their chosen social objectives.  
 
The cost-effectiveness of policy instruments used in securing different habitats vary in time and 
space. For example, conservation of natural forests with abundant amount of decaying wood 
requires permanent protection and relatively large areas, while herb-rich forests are often relatively 
small and occasionally require management, which is possible to implement with flexible 
incentives (Sironena, et al., 2020). Based on Campbell (1987), for cost-effective biodiversity 
policy the general requirements for a policy mechanism to yield a predictable outcome must be 
factored at the policy design stage.  
 
Cost effectiveness requires competitiveness amount service providers. This is to prevent the use 
of market power to engage in rent seeking behavior.  However, traditional administrative roles and 
norms of forestry and environmental forest professionals as regards forests and forest owners have 
constrained the implementation of competitiveness (Primmer et al., 2013). Even when entering 
PES schemes is voluntary, their implementation relies heavily on the information and support 
provided by administration (Sironena, et al., 2020). 
 
Cost-effectiveness is related with the quality of information held by both the buyer and the seller 
in forest biodiversity procurement. The first best scenario operates on the assumption of perfect 
information. This implies, in theory, that any informational imbalance is a potential source of 
information rent by any actor with the informational advantage. Although opportunity cost is the 
 22 
most important consideration in devising an optimal conservation payment system, failure to 
incorporate information about environmental benefit may undermine the cost-effectiveness of a 
conservation program. The cost-effectiveness of a conservation program can be enhanced by 
integrating cost-benefit information into program design (Duke et al., 2014; Sharma, Cho, & Yu, 
2019). This is because cost considerations alone will not take into account the quality of service 
expected from landowner. That will be like assuming homogeneous product which can be a strong 
assumption in a biodiversity setting.  
 
2.7 Forest management and biodiversity procurement auctions 
Procurement auctions are preferred for forest biodiversity management mainly due to the 
theoretical potential of an auctions to address, to some extent, the challenge of information 
asymmetry under specific conditions (Vickrey 1961; McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  Landowners 
will tend to have a more detailed understanding than procuring agencies about the opportunity 
costs of foregoing intensive land uses to pursue conservation practices (Banerjee & Conte, 2018). 
Through bidder competition, procurement auctions can mitigate the information advantage held 
by sellers regarding the cost of producing the goods and services available for sale.  
 
The basic idea in procurement auctions is that the buyer receives bids from sellers of the services, 
bids are then evaluated, and winners are awarded the contract. Payment of the contract payoff is 
made to compensate winners for their opportunity cost of the conservation measures implemented. 
Participating and bidding in auctions is voluntary. No agent would participate in an auction if his 
expected net benefit is negative (Romstad et al., 2012). This is both the curse and the blessing of 
auctions. A curse in the sense that bidders may seek to extract information rents, i.e., extra benefits 
beyond the compensation level needed for them to accept a contract. A blessing in the sense that 
if an auction is well designed, bidders will not seek excessive compensations, but bid what they 
need to be slightly better off than they were initially (Romstad et al., ibid.).  
 
In procurement auctions for forest biodiversity management, the buyer, often the state, receives 
bids from multiple sellers and enters into a contract with bidders whose forest plots have the 
desired conservation attributes at the lowest cost given the budget available. Provided that the bids 
reflect costs, this maximizes biodiversity benefits for a given available budget. This however does 
not reflect how bidders will behave in the light of new information that suggest that the contract 
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significantly understates their opportunity cost. Post-contract, the truthfulness of agent type 
become exposed to the reality checks of new information. The probability to violate the terms of 
the contract becomes high if new information suggest that agents significantly undervalued their 
opportunity cost and went this happens it is only the legal barrier created by a contract that stands 
in the seller´s way to non-compliance. 
  
Sealed bid auctions are the preferred type of auction for (forest) biodiversity conservation. Being 
sealed means that other bidders cannot observe competing bids. There are other auction types that 
are opened like the English or the Dutch auction. Sealed auctions are of two kinds, the first price 
sealed-bid auction, also known as discriminatory price auction and the second-price sealed bid 
auction. In first-price sealed auctions, each winning bidder is paid an amount equal to their bids. 
This implies that lower bidders receive lower contract pay off.  
 
Second-price sealed bid auctions are designed following the structure proposed by Vickrey (1961). 
In Vickrey (1961), the highest bidder is the winner and is paid an amount equal to the second 
highest bid.  The Second-price sealed auctions are referred to as uniform price auctions or N+1 
price auction when multiple similar items are sold. In such auctions each winning bidder recieves 
the same payment which equals the size of the first non-winning bid. 
 
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Information Rent in Forest Biodiversity Auctions 
The information structure of conservation procurement auctions has attracted significant attention 
due to how information asymmetries between sellers and the conservation buyer drive auction 
outcomes (Conte & Griffin, 2017). Landowners may have relatively less knowledge about the 
landscape-scale functional processes that generate ecosystem services and the techniques used to 
estimate the value of these services. In conservation procurement auction experiments in which 
the assessed environmental quality is an exogenous attribute of a submitted offer, withholding this 
information has been shown to improve auction efficiency by preventing high offers from 
landowners with high-quality submissions (Banerjee, Kwasnica, & Shortle, 2015;  
 
On the contrary, Cason, Gangadharan, & Duke, 2003). Conte & Griffin (2017) found that 
providing ES-quality information allows sellers to identify and submit higher-quality conservation 
actions, an effect that counteracts previously identified efficiency losses from information rents.  
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For a private forest owner, you stand to pay a disproportionally high cost per unit relative to other 
members of society if the true cost of biodiversity is not revealed, something which is also 
vulnerable to incomplete information. This means that the seller´s subjective valuation and bid 
formation are also affected by uncertainty. In other words, the subjectively defined opportunity 
cost of the seller is also constrained by incomplete information too. Thus, this tends to be a 
negotiation between the buyer and the seller, founded on imperfect information on cost and benefit 
which has a potential to favor either the buyer or the seller.  
 
Agent-based models, which incorporate the agent's bid-learning behavior, has been applied in 
studies on multiple-round auctions.  These studies found that conservation auctions are more cost-
efficient than fixed-rate payment approaches with limited conservation budgets, given bidders with 
heterogeneous opportunity costs. However, the advantage of conservation auctions erodes quickly 
when bidders learn in successive auction rounds. (Sharma, Cho, & Yu, 2019). 
 
Seller perceptions of their extent of ignorance about the benefits of biodiversity and their 
opportunity costs may reinforce their desire to maximizing information rent during bidding. It may 
also influence them to give a false impression of being a low-cost provider, but only to exploit the 
lapse in monitoring during contract implementation. From the perspective of a conservation 
agency seeking to enhance social welfare, socially efficient conservation procurement rests on the 
value of the provided public good exceeding the provision cost. Therefore, from a social welfare 
perspective, seller rents are a distributional consideration, not an efficiency consideration 
(Claassen, Cattaneo, & Johansson, 2008; Conte & Griffin, 2017). 
 
2.9 Truthful Revelation 
Truthful revelation is valuable a feature of auctions and critical to cost effectiveness. It reveals 
seller’s subjective valuation of the payoff from the contract based on their privately held 
information about their respective costs (Romstad et al., 2012). Together with voluntary 
participation and bidding and the rule that lowest bidders win, truthful revelation delivers cost 
effectiveness at the auction design stage.  
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For competent evaluation of their opportunity value seller must conduct systematic assessment of 
the value of their next best option. This involves estimating the present value of returns from 
forestry in the case of a forest landowner whose next best option is the value of net returns from 
forestry. Bid formation is done pre-contract and compliance can be observed post contract. 
Uncertainty surround the behavior of actors is dynamic, thus the passage of time presents new 
information that actors use to update old beliefs. This means that a well-informed estimate of 
seller´s opportunity value improves predictability of procurement outcomes.  
 
According to Sharma, Cho, & Yu, (2019), the impact of integrating cost-benefit information to 
ensure efficiency gains or to ensure minimal efficiency losses in a multi-round conservation 
auction (dynamic setting), where landowners learn to extract information rents, has not been 
explored adequately. Knowledge about the impacts of alternative correlation levels between spatial 
costs and benefits can guide policymakers in choosing an optimal information strategy that ensures 
the cost-efficiency of a conservation program in a dynamic setting (Sharma et al., ibid.).  
 
2.10 Compliance issues related to biodiversity management 
Translating policy targets into real impactful solutions is done during post-contract delivery of the 
procured service. At this stage enforcement of the contract terms, monitoring for compliance with 
contract terms, is essential. It gives effect to the pre-contract policy instrument design effort 
towards cost-effectiveness and may erode the gains expected from good planning or exposes poor 
planning. Conservation contracts, aimed at encouraging preservation and maintenance of natural 
areas, generally involve long-term obligations. Yet, contractors can find it profitable to breach the 
agreement when the opportunity cost of keeping their land under conservation purposes, and 
contracts do not provide for adequate early termination penalties (Corato, et al., 2018). 
 
A contract is, “in the simplest definition, a promise enforceable by law. The promise may be to do 
something or to refrain from doing something¨ (Taylor von Mehren, 2019). The difficulty in 
observing some forest biodiversity management output means that agents may not produce, or 
underproduce, the output and still obtain a payment as if the contract had been performed; such 
that the procurer needs to conduct random inspections and administer a penalty to induce 
compliance of the agents. (Choi, 2018).  
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Claassen et al. (2008) reported that USDA conducts annual inspections on 5% of CRP contracts, 
and non-compliance results in withholding of subsidies in addition to repayment with interests. 
According to their report most programs administered by the Farm Service Agency and the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service, require non-compliant landowners to refund all benefits 
received. In case fraud is proven, non-compliant landowners are liable to penalties.  
 
Choi (2018) makes the point that when the expected efficiency of agents is high, the procurer can 
save information rents, contracts approach first-best outcome and output distortions are minimal 
despite the co-existence of information asymmetries.  
 
2.11 Bid Formation and compliance  
Bid formation and submission in conservation procurement auctions in particular, can be difficult 
for bidders (Banerjee & Conte, 2018). In multi-attribute conservation auctions, bids for submitted 
conservation practices are evaluated on the basis of offered price and the resultant environmental 
quality (Claassen et al. 2008; Hellerstein et al. 2015). Lack of information about environmental 
quality could limit a bidder’s ability to identify her optimal practice for submission (Banerjee & 
Conte, 2018).  
Compliance and bidding may be related. Compliance can be observing after the contract is 
implemented. If bidders realize that they underestimated their opportunity cost, they may have 
increased probability to violate the terms of the contract. This may account for a trend of increasing 
bids over time in multi-round auctions.  It is possible that bidders may genuinely bid truthfully and 
not comply on account of not adequately valuing their opportunity cost, perhaps owning to 
incomplete information about opportunity costs. If truth telling is achieved and adverse selection 
is observed, or negative relationship is observed between bid size and noncompliance what might 
explain that? These are question relevant to this study. Do least cost bidders systematically violate 
terms and why? If this relationship holds, then a case will have been made for Uniform price 
auction because the information rent paid to winning bidders may minimize a tendency to not 




Chapter 3: Method of study 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present the conceptual framework, model and process based on which the study 
was done. In order to give some information about the forest setting used in the analysis, I start 
with a brief description of the forest industry in Norway. I then describe the conceptual framework 
of the study. Afterwards, I present the model for the study. I end the chapter with a description of 
the analysis carried in the study. 
 
3.2 Norwegian Forest Industry 
Forests cover about 38 percent of Norway's land area, or about 122.000 square kilometers. Of this, 
around 86.600 square kilometers are productive forests. On average, Norwegian forests increase 
by about 25 million cubic meters of timber per year. The main tree species by volume and 
economic importance are spruce, pine and birch. Spruce accounts for half of this growth. Every 
year about ten million cubic meters of timber are felled. Forestry is an industry practically all over 
the country (Norwegian Minstry of Food and Agriculture, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.1: A Bird´s-eye view of a typical productive forest in Norway 
 
 
Credit: Bård Løken/Samfoto 
Source (Norwegian Minstry of Food and Agriculture, 2014) 
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Norwegian Forestry policy aims to facilitate sustainable resource management. Policy makers 
believe that biodiversity is best served by a combination of conservation and sustainable use. This 
means ensuring that harvesting does not exceed regeneration, and also other forest values in the 
form of recreation and ecosystem services are promoted (Norwegian Minstry of Food and 
Agriculture, 2014). 
 
In 2019, total commercial roundwood removal stood at 11 039 000 cubic metres compared to 10 
836 000 in 2018, an increase of 1.87%. Spruce is the main source of timber. It constituted over 
70% of commercial timber output in 2018 as well as in 2019.  
 
Table 3.1: Structure of timber commercial timber output in 2018 and 2019 
Timber 2018 Percent 2019 Percent 
Spruce 8 027 000 74.07 7 934 000 71.87 
Pine 2 551 000 23.54 2 802 000 25.38 
Broad-leaved 258 000 2.39 303 000 2.75 
Total 10 836 000 100 11 039 000 100 
        
Gross Value 4 446 000 000 NOK  4 799 000 000 NOK  
Sources: (Statistics Norway, 2019) 
 
The average prices of timber in Norway in 2019 was 435 NOK per cubic meter, a 6% increase on 
2018 price of timber. Between 2007 and 2019, the weighted spruce timber prices have ranged from 















Table 3.2: Average price of timber and commercial roundwood removals from 2007 to 2019. 
Year  
Commercial roundwood removals 
(1 000 m³) 
Average Price (NOK) per Cubic 
Meter of Roundwood 
2007 8212 375 
2008 8071 364 
2009 6631 307 
2010 8322 355 
2011 8507 362 
2012 8787 328 
2013 9020 309 
2014 9808 349 
2015 10113 339 
2016 10345 329 
2017 10491 354 
2018 10793 410 
2019 11039 435 
Sources: (Statistics Norway, 2019) 
 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
The study is based on a conceptual framing of a rational forestland owner trying to maximize net 
returns on their forest land when subjectively valuing their opportunity value in a N+1 price forest 
biodiversity auction. Winners of the contract will be awarded an annual payment with present 
value v, over the duration of the contract. In an N+1 price auction, 
 
 𝑣 = 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖          (3.1) 
 
v is equal for all agents. It is the bid of the first non-winning bidder. 𝑏𝑖is the agent i´s bid formed 
based on their subjective valuation of their opportunity income. 𝑟𝑖is information rent paid to agent 
i as an incentive to ensure truthful revelation. 
 
The landowner´s problem in this setting is similar to choosing an optimal rotation age that 
maximize dynamic efficiency in an infinite rotation forest model. The landowner has a problem of 
deciding subjectively, his/her opportunity value in order to maximize returns from conservation. 
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The optimal harvest time that maximizes expected revenue from the forest stand is important in 
the landowner´s subjective valuation of opportunity value in bid formation in order for dynamic 
efficiency. This is relevant for evaluating true opportunity cost for the landowner, identification of 
least cost providers for the buyer and the design of effective monitoring strategy for biodiversity 
management auction.   
 
Price uncertainties during the harvest periods and flexibility in harvest timing enable landowners 
to implement a flexible price-harvest strategy (Brazee & Mendelsohn, 1988) in order to maximize 
the value of their harvest. This is done by waiting for a stumpage price that is greater than the 
landowner´s reservation price when the landowner expects higher prices. On the other hand, the 
landowner may harvest earlier than normal (normal is Faustmann harvest time at mean price) when 
landowners expect lower prices. 
 
In this context, the first objective of this thesis is to explore the implications of the possibility of a 
flexible price-harvest strategy for expected bids in a N+1 price auction design, and implementation 
subsequently I will discuss the implications price uncertainties on forest value for forest 
biodiversity conservation management. 
 
3.3.1 The basic forest harvest model 
Suppose the buyer intends to improve forest biodiversity in a country, say Norway, through N+1 
procurement auction. The use of an N+1 auction is preferred for its potential to truthfully reveal 
sellers´ opportunity cost through their subjective valuation. The state will aim to achieve the most 
conservation value with the available conservation budget.  I assume that the buyer will aim to 
keep the land under the conservation program for duration of infinite optimal rotations. This means 
that the standing, biologically mature forest will stand for another optimal rotation age T* under 
conservation.  The state will set out to identify landowners who have an acceptable balance of 
conservation value and cost effectiveness. Once a seller wins in the auction, i.e., has an accepted 
bid, the state will commence an annual payment with present value, v, to the seller over the 
timeframe of the conservation program as compensation.  
 
Suppose a forestland of interest has a uniform stand of Norwegian spruce. Spruce has a maturity 
age of 70 years on a high productivity forest land in Norway. The landowner plants and waits up 
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to the biological maturity of the trees, cuts and replants in that cycle infinitely.  For simplicity I 
assume the land can support the growth of only Norwegian spruce and also have the conservation 
value of interest. I also assume, for simplicity, that land rent is equal whether under forestry or 
conservation. Norwegian spruce has market value at maturity and generates some net profits for 
the landowner (who is also the forest owner). I assume that the timber yield function of Norwegian 
spruce is well-behaved. This means that the yield function, 𝑋𝑡,  is concave for the age intervals 
relevant for timber harvesting. 
   
Suppose that the seller is informed that timber harvesting can be flexibly timed in order to reap the 
benefits for annual local peaks in prices. These local peaks cannot be known in advance but are 
characteristic of timber prices. It is a kind of demand driven random price fluctuation that occur in 
the typical cycle of timber prices (Brazee & Mendelsohn, 1988). Even though in reality the mean 
price of timber may change overtime, let us assume for simplicity that the mean price of timber is 
preserved during these annual cycles. This will enable me to focus on the price annual price 
uncertainty rather the trend in mean price. Prices are assumed to be exogenous. Forest owners 
operate in a competitive market. This means that individual landowners take the price for given, 
and harvest the quantity of timber that they are willing and able to supply 
 
The forest owner (seller) is interested in participating in the N + 1 procurement auction and has a 
problem of subjectively valuing his/her opportunity value. What bids can the buyer expect from 
the seller in this context? The buyer is interested in compensating sellers to the extent of their true 
opportunity value. This thesis will show that the seller will endeavor to account for the potential 
to exploit the price volatility in business as usual by bidding close to prices which he/she would 
expect to accept in normal forest industry setting when price uncertainty exists.  
 
In order to keep the seller indifferent between remaining in conservation program or returning to 
forestry business as usual, the buyer must be willing and able to compensate the seller as much as 
the seller can reasonably expect under a forest industry business as usual scenario. 
Under this setting, the landowner will aim to maximize net returns from the forest through an 
informed estimation of optimal harvest age (T*). The harvest age, T, will be duration (usually in 
years) at which for a given stand, the benefits deferring harvesting are equal to the cost of deferring 
the next and all other future rotations. This means that the rate of growth of the undiscounted net 
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benefit of the present timber stand should be equal to the interest that could have been earned from 
timber revenues and the returns lost from establishing subsequent stands. 
 
Let planting cost (a), marginal harvesting costs (hc) and the gross price of felled timber (P) be 
constant in real terms over time. Let net price of timber be (p) = P – hc. Net price, p, is assumed 
to be constant in real terms over time. Let the yield function of Norwegian spruce be represented 
by XT. let the interest rate i be constant over time, for simplicity. Then the present value of the 
landowner´s profit function for one rotation will be: 
 
𝑝𝑋𝑇𝑒
−𝑖𝑇 − 𝑎          (3.2) 
 
Equation (3.2) means the discounted timber value at time T minus planting cost. The planting cost 
a is not discounted because it occurs at time 0, the start of the rotation. For an existing rotation, a 
is a sunk cost. It is the net timber value, which is expected at the future time when T has elapsed, 
that is discounted. 
 
The net present value of profits over an infinite sequence of rotations will be given by 
 
𝐻 =  [𝑝𝑋𝑇𝑒
−𝑖𝑇 − 𝑎] + 𝑒−𝑖𝑇[𝑝𝑋𝑇𝑒
−𝑖𝑇 − 𝑎] + 𝑒−2𝑖𝑇[𝑝𝑋𝑇𝑒
−𝑖𝑇 − 𝑎] + 𝑒−3𝑖𝑇[𝑝𝑋𝑇𝑒
−𝑖𝑇 − 𝑎] + ⋯  
….           (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) can be simplified to 
𝐻 = [𝑝𝑋𝑇𝑒
−𝑖𝑇 − 𝑎] + 𝑒−𝑖𝑇𝐻        (3.3) 
 
This can then be solved as 
 




          (3.4) 
Equation (3.4) gives the present value of profits, H, for any rotation length, T, given values p, a, i, 
and timber yield function XT under an infinite rotation model. This is the familiar Faustmann 
(1848) formula for infinitely repeated rotations using my notation. T* will maximize H. T* is the 




Equation (3.4) gives the present value of profits, H, for any rotation length, T, given values p, a, i, 
and timber yield function XT under an infinite rotation model. This is the familiar Faustmann 
(1848) formula for infinitely repeated rotations using my notation. T* will maximize H. T* is the 
Faustmann optimal harvest time for an infinite rotation model. 
  
The solution to (3.4) follows the principles of Faustmann’s solution. In order to find the T*, I find 




= −1(𝑝𝑋𝑇 − 𝑎)(𝑒
𝑖𝑇 − 1)
2





= 0     (3.5) 
 





= 𝑖𝑝𝑋𝑇 + 𝑖𝐻          (3.6) 
 
Equation (3.6) is the efficiency condition for present-value maximization in infinite rotation 
forestry and given 𝑋𝑇, i, p and a, T* can be determined.   𝐻 is interpreted as the site value of land 
which I assume is constant for simplicity without loss of general insights. It is the maximized 
present value of an endless number of stands of timber that could be grown on the land. 
 
3.3.2 The basic forest harvest model when participation in a conservation program 
For a landowner that is considering participating in a N+1 forest biodiversity auction, the buyer 
should be willing and able to compensate the landowner with a value equivalent to 𝑝𝑋𝑇 at T* per 
rotation over the multiple rotations possible. Let v be the present value of an annual payment to be 
made by the buyer to the landowner for per rotation as opportunity value compensated for comply 
with conservation contract terms and let Y be the present value of total compensation to be made 
to the seller per rotation. Then 
 
𝑌 = 𝑣𝑇 = 𝑝𝑋𝑇𝑒
−𝑖𝑇 − 𝑎        (3.7) 
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for any given rotation. For all rotations, a similar calculation like what was done with equations 
(3.2) and (3.3) will lead to equation (3.4), 
 













= 𝑣         (3.9) 
 





= 𝑖𝑝𝑋𝑇 + 𝑖𝐻 = 𝑣        (3.10) 
 
Equation (3.10) means that v, the present value of the annual payment to be made to the seller 
under the conservation program should be equal to the seller’s opportunity value that maximizes 
present value of net profit under forestry in order for the buyer to be fully compensated for the 
participation constraint to hold.  
 
3.3.3 The basic forest harvest model with conservation options and random timber prices 
To this point the model has assumed constant stumpage prices P and cutting cost a, thus net price 
p, has been constant. However due to price uncertainties and the flexibility of timber harvest time, 
the landowner can be expected to try to exploit price fluctuations that occur annually in the forest 
industry in a bid to maximize forest profits, as shown by Brazee & Mendelsohn, (1988). Timber 
owners know today´s price but are uncertain about tomorrow´s prices. Traditional Faustmann 
harvesting as shown above ignores these random annual price fluctuations and prescribes harvests 
on the basis of expected prices.  
 
Given price uncertainty and the ability to postponed harvesting for an expected higher price, the 
landowner´s expected bids will tend towards annual local peak prices. This is because in practical 
forestry, during harvest period, the landowner can deviate from T* and harvest earlier of later in 
order to benefit from a higher actual market price (the mean price plus its random increase). The 
flexibility of choice of harvest time givens forester´s the opportunity to maximize revenue from 
 35 
the mature stand because they can follow price and then decide whether to cut or wait, just like 
how traders follow prices of stocks or commodities. By tailoring harvests to variations in prices, 
the present value of all future timber revenues can be greatly enhanced over the standard 
Faustmann model (Brazee & Mendelsohn, 1988). This goes on for a given rotation and can be 
expected to be repeated over multiple rotations since the multiple rotation is essentially a repetition 
of single rotation activities multiple times in a sequence. 
  
The basic intuition of this model is that the owner should cut timber today only if today´s timber 
value is higher than what he expects the present value of future timber value to be. The expected 
future timber unit value, in turn depends on a set of uncertain future prices as well as the yield 
function. The present value of this maximum expected future timber value becomes the current 
reservation price. When the current price is below the reservation price, the owner delays harvest 
for the age class for and additional period. When the current price exceeds the reservation price, 
the owner harvests the entire age class (Brazee & Mendelsohn, 1988).  
 
In this thesis, I assume the predicted value of P based on time to be the agent´s reservation price. 
Based on a good model of timber price development, a better prediction can be used.  I am 
interested in showing that an agent that engages in flexible price harvesting should be expected to 
bid higher that the price. The bids of such a landowner will tend towards annual local price peaks 
due to flexible harvesting and price uncertainty.  
 
In order to model the landowner´s flexible harvesting behaviour, I make some additional 
assumptions. I assume that the landowner can determine the expected mean and variance of the 
random component of future prices. However actual prices are assumed to be unpredictable, drawn 
randomly from this known distribution. I also assumes the error structure around an empirical 
model´s predictions is normally distributed. I assume that the landowner is risk nuetrality for 
simplicity at this stage. This based on the notion that the forester has sufficient wealth that he is 
risk-neutral to the timber in a particular year. Being a risk-neutral bidder, the management 
objective should be to maximise the expected present value of net returns. 
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The current price Pt is known in year t and is assumed constant for the entire year. A new random 
price, 𝑃𝑇 is established each year, which I assume to be statistically independent of the previous 
year´s price.  
 





= 𝑖𝑝𝑋𝑇 + 𝑖𝐻 
 
In practice, because prices are not constant, the expected value of prices E(𝑃𝑇) is used as the 
estimate of price in the Faustmann equation. With fluctuating prices, the owner must decide 
between a certain price today and unknown prices in the future. The reservation price is based on 
the expected return one could earn by delaying harvest.Whenever the offered price is above the 
reservation price, the owner accepts the price and cuts. Conversely, whenever the offered price is 
below the reservation price, the owner delays harvest another period. Because prices below the 
reservation price tends to be rejected, the accepted price have a higher expected value than the 
offered prices. Compared to a more rigid harvest rule such as the Faustmann model, Brazee & 
Mendelsohn, (1988) demonstrate that the flexible harvest strategy can increase expected revenue 
by more fully utilizing available information.  
 
 The expected present value of a flow of net revenue with varying prices is the sum of the 
discounted net revenue generated by the product of accepted prices times volume in each period 
weighted by the likelihood that the owner sells his timber in that period. Since a forest owner who 
accepts a given price will always accept a higher price that period, we can characterise the price 
accepted by the owner in each period t in terms of a minimum accepted Pmin,t (the reservation 
price). The expected value of a harvest in year t given a reservation price of Pmin,t is : 
 
𝐻𝑡 = ∫ (𝑝𝑋𝑡  + 𝐸 [𝑍])𝑓(𝑝)𝑑𝑝

𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑡 
        (3.11) 
 
where f(p) is the probability of price 𝑝 = 𝑃𝑡 > 𝐸(𝑃𝑇) occurring that year. The first element of this 
payoff,  𝑝𝑋𝑡, is the expected revenue in the first period for havesting the standing timber, the 
product of accepted price and timber volume weighted by the likelihood of being offered those 
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prices. The second element , 𝐸[𝑍] in the expected payoff is the present value land rent. The value 
of waiting includes not just the revenue from next period but also the possible revenue from all 
future harvest dates which owners may end up waiting for. 
 
Brazee & Mendelsohn, (1988) find that a greater spread of offered prices around the mean will 
increase the present value of future forest net revenue to the owner, other factor unchanged. A 
reservation price that leads to the rejection of some offered prices, implies that the expected net 
present value from a flexible price-harvest strategy will exceed the present value of revenue 
associated with Faustmann rotations. If the owner ever finds it desirable to cut his timber earlier 
or later than the Faustmann rotation, he does so only to increase expected profits. This is because 
in reality, landowners have the opportunity to maximize benefits from market information when 
deciding to execute cutting. Since the increased number and severity of lower prices can be 
truncated and therefore ignored, increases in spread tends to raise the expected revenue from 
accepted prices.  
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Chapter Four: Decision Analysis  
 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I conduct a decision analysis of the forest owner´s decision problem based on data 
from the Norwegian forest industry in order to demonstrate how price fluctuations might affect 
agents´ bids. First, I use available price data, and an assumed interest rate and growth rate to 
demonstrate the basis for expected bids under complete information. This analysis reveals what 
timber price would have formed the basis of the cut or conserve decision of forest owners with the 
benefit of hindsight. I continue with a forecast analysis of the decision process under timber price 
uncertainty. Finally, I analyze the implications of timber price uncertainty for bidding under N+1 
price conservation auction. 
 
4.1 Analysis of past data from Norwegian forest industry 
In order to demonstrate the implications of flexible price harvesting on expected bids I use yearly 
timber price data for 2007 to 2019 to show expected bids under complete information. In doing 
this analysis the forest owner looks back in time to understand which random price would have 
generated the highest timber value. This period is presented as a 13-year time window which within 
a mature forest is most profitable to harvest under no price uncertainty. I believe that for a tree like 
Norwegian spruce and under the economic, climatic and land conditions in southeastern Norway, 
a period of 13 years is reasonable for illustrating the impacts of price uncertainty on the optimal 
harvesting time. Other kinds of trees and other environmental and economic conditions may 
warrant a shorter or longer period.  
 
I make a simplifying assumption that the decision to cut or conserve is to be made in a single 
rotation context. This means that 𝑝
𝑑𝑋𝑇
𝑑𝑇
= 𝑖𝑝𝑋𝑇 (equation 3.6 in a single rotation model) is the 
dynamic efficiency condition for the landowner to maximize the timber value of a mature forest. 
The use of t in this section represents time periods within the 13-year period. In times before this 
13-year period forest growth rate exceeds the interest rate, and in times beyond this period, forest 
growth rate becomes less than the interest rate. This provides a window with which the effects of 
flexible harvesting and timber price fluctuations on the forest owner´s decisions can be observed 
and analyzed. I used average commercial roundwood timber prices in Norway from 2007 to 2019 
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as the random prices that exist with this 13-year period. As discussed earlier, these random prices 
cannot be observed ahead of time. Table 4.1 shows summary statistics on the random gross prices 
in the period. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics on gross average annual timber prices for 2007 to 2019 






13 355 36.6 307 435 
Source: Author´s analysis of data 
 
Table 4.1 shows that within the period, ranged from a minimum of 307 NOK to a maximum of 
435 NOK, with a mean value of 355 NOK. Figure 4.1 shows fluctuations in the random price with 
the 13-year period of interest. 
 
Figure 4.1: Gross timber prices used in the Analysis: 
 
  
Source: Author´s plot of timber price data 
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Forest owners make optimal harvesting decides based on their net timber price expectation in 
comparison with their reservation price in a given year under flexible price harvesting. In order to 
focus on random timber prices, I assume that the effects of timber growth rate and interest rate on 
timber value over the period are negligible. This assumption is important because over the 13-year 
period, a positive value of tree growth rate will have a positive effect on timber value over time 
through an increase in the timber volume. 
 
The determination of the optimal harvest age (based on (𝑃𝑡 − ℎ𝑐)
𝑑𝑋𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑖(𝑃𝑡 − ℎ𝑐)𝑋𝑡) within this 
period depends on the value of random net price pat at period t, harvest cost hc, interest rate i, forest 
growth rate, g. To calculate net price, I assume a constant real harvest cost, of 120 NOK per cubic 
meter in the 13-year period. This is consistent with current timber harvest costs which varies 
between 100 NOK and 130 NOK per meter cube (Viken Skog, pers. mess). I also assume an 
interest rate and growth rate of 1%. Table 4.2 shows calculated values of pat 
 






(pat) = Pt - hc  
1 375 255 
2 364 244 
3 307 187 
4 355 235 
5 362 242 
6 328 208 
7 309 189 
8 349 229 
9 339 219 
10 329 209 
11 354 234 
12 410 290 
13 435 315 
Source: Author´s Calculations 
 
Figure 4.2 shows five periods within which Stumpage prices would have been of interest to the 
forest owner. These are periods 1, 4, 5, 8 and 13.  Based on figure 4.2 and with the benefit of 
hindsight, period 13 presented the highest peak price. If forest owners could observe random prices 
 41 
with full certainty, they would have based their conservation contract bids on the random net price 
of 315 NOK in period 13 (the 2019 prices).  
 
Figure 4.2: Net prices for the period and Hotelling price path for periods 1 and 13 
 
 
Sources: Author´s analysis of data 
 
The decision of cutting in period 13 brings maximum timber value to the forest owner compared 
to the other 12 periods. This is possible due to some flexibility in the time of timber harvesting, 
and this choice is easier under complete information compared to when future timber prices are 
uncertain. Cutting in period 13 comes with an added marginal benefit in the form timber growth 
with the periods that the forest owner waited. In this analysis that will be 12 more years of timber 
growth as a result of the wait. The next best price occurs in period 1. However, not only is this 
price lower, cutting in period 1 would have denied the forest owner the added benefits that waiting 
would have generated in the form of growth in timber volume.  It is important to note that where 
a particular forest owner finds lines in the period under consideration depends on when he or she 
entered this window. This means that what is period one can be a different period for another forest 
owner base on their context. 
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4.2 Forecasting of timber prices 
The cut or conserve decision is made by the forest owner based on recent past timber market data, 
the forest owner´s interpretation of the present demand and supply conditions in the market and 
most their prices expectations in the relevant future.  At any given period, the forest owner is fully 
informed about the current random net price. The decision to cut or conserve depends on whether 
the current net price exceeds their reservation price.  
 
The optimal decision rule of the price search is that for the forest owner to cut when the current 
random price exceeds their reservation price, otherwise wait (Brazee and Mendelsohn, 1988). This 
implies that all prices below the reservation price will be rejected by the forest owner. It is a 
sequential process. At the early periods of the decision window if one is certain that higher peaks 
will arise in the future, it is optimal for to wait. Once you decide to wait in the current period, your 
reservation price is updated. The decision to cut or wait also depends on the individual forest 
owner’s degree of risk aversion. A more risk averse decision maker will have a tendency to cut 
early while one with relatively lower risk aversion is more likely to wait. The reason for this is that 
the more risk averse the decision maker is, the stronger is his or her preference for the secure 
outcome, in this case cut early. 
 
In order to illustrate this point, I show in figure 4.3 below a forecast of net prices of timber per 
cubic meter for the next 13-year period. Assuming that a forest owner expects higher net timber 
prices in the periods ahead, he or she will wait and update his or her reservation price to the current 
price. The current price used in this illustration is the net price of period 13, net price for 2019.    
I use the Hotelling price path generated at an interest rate of 1% to show price path of the current 
price over the next 12 periods. The mean values of the expected prices for each period are shown 
together with standard errors of the forecast. Expected prices in the distant future are shown to be 
more uncertain and have greater standard errors associated with them compared to expected prices 






Figure 4.3: Hypothetical expected prices and Hotelling price path for current price 
 
 
Source: Author´s design 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that a forest owner with this pattern of expected prices looks forward to most 
future prices been below the current price path except in periods 3, 7, 9 and 12. This pattern may 
be due to the current price being significantly high and not frequently occurring. Moreover, this 
pattern will be informed by the forest owner’s analysis based of prevailing market condition and 
expected changes in them. All expected prices below the current reservation price within the 
decision window will be rejected. As there are several expected prices above the Hotelling price 
path, namely in periods 3, 7, 9 and 12, the expected optimal decision based on available data in 
period 1, is not to cut in period 1. In period 2, new price data becomes available, and hence updated 
forecasts are made.   
In succeeding periods in the decision window, as new data become available and forecasts are 
updated, the decision to cut or wait is repeated.  As the time window nears closing, there will be 




Given this state of price expectations in the decision window, a forest owner with high risk 
aversion is more likely either to cut or not go beyond the third period. This is due to the relatively 
high uncertainty associated with prices in the periods more distant in window. On the other hand, 
a relatively less risk averse individual may be inclined to reject the current price and the expected 
price in period 3 in search for the much higher expected prices in period 7, 9 or even 12. If a forest 
owner decides not to cut in period 3, his or her reservation price is updated to the price in period 3 
and search continues into the future. This is a continuous process within the logging time window 






Discussion of Findings 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study aimed to explore through a decision analysis the impact of uncertain timber prices and 
flexible harvesting have on bid formation in N+1 price forest biodiversity auction.  The specific 
objectives were; to explore how timber prices uncertainty, affect agents bid formation in N+1 price 
forest biodiversity auction and to explore its implications for other relevant aspects of N+1 auction 
design and implementation The decision analysis conducted in chapter four used the price search 
model developed by Brazee & Mendelsohn (1988) to demonstrate how price variability and 
flexibility in harvesting enables forest owners to access high random prices in the timber market.  
 
In this chapter the findings of the decision analysis are discussed to highlight the implications of 
uncertain timber prices on bidding and on other relevant aspects of N +1 price auction design. I 
start with a discussion on implications of timber price uncertainty for bids and continue with 
discussions on implications for other aspects of the auction like securing participations, issues of 
informational advantages between parties to the auction, and other practical issues of N +1 auction 
design. 
5.2 Implications timber prices uncertainty for bids 
The cut or wait decision analyzed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 because a harvest or conserve decision 
in a context where a conservation bid is being considered by the forest owner. The net price at 
which timber is harvest serves as the basis of the bids made by forest owners and all the discussions 
done so far on how a cut price will be determined will be directly considered when bidding in a 
conservation auction.  The bidder will try to bid an amount enough to fully compensate him or her 
for the net profit from the forest stand while also avoiding loss of the contract. This is what will 
secure their participation in the conservation program. 
 
The level of risk aversion will influence the size of bids submitted because it determines bidders´ 
willingness to take chances on losing a secure outcome in search for a higher price. The reason for 
this is that the bid a forest owner submits in a conservation auction is one where he or she expects 
to be indifferent between getting and not getting a contract. Not getting a contract under timber 
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price uncertainty implies waiting for a higher timber price. This will be reflected in the individual 
forest owner’s bid. 
 
Moreover, in a conservation bid, highly risk averse bidders will be less likely to benefit from the 
extra value that random prices may present because they would rather opt for a secure low net 
price now ever if there is a good chance that there will be higher net prices in the future. On the 
other hand, less risk averse bidders will tend to bid higher because they are willing to wait for a 
higher net price. 
 
In an N+1 procurement bid, the bidder knows that by handing in a low bid, he or she may free ride 
on other bids because he will be paid based on the first non-winning bid. However, the bidder does 
not know the degree of risk aversion and the degree of sophistication of other bidders. If bidders 
rely on a naive understanding of the forest market, they are likely to forfeit some value. On the 
other hand, a few sophisticated bidders may cause contract pay out to winners to be higher that the 
buyer expects. 
 
Thus, the levels of bids will reflect to some extent the bidders´ expectations about future prices 
and their degree of risk aversion. this arises because the bidding decision is been made in a context 
of timber price uncertainty.  Note that expectations about future timber prices are linked to their 
understanding of the timber market and the economy as a whole. The flexibility in timing the 
harvest decision and the expectation of a high random price in future credits the forest owner 
confidence to submit higher bids.  
 
5.3 Implication of timber price uncertainty for other practical aspects of auction design and 
implementation. 
5.3.1 Timing of Auction 
In general, the analysis suggests that timing of the offer for conservation bids is important for cost 
effectiveness. It will serve the buyer of conservation services well if offer for bids are be made in 
times when the economic outlook suggests low expected timber price. This will result in relatively 





While naive bidders may submit low bids, compliance may be a challenge if the opportunity cost 
of conservation (net timber prices) increase by a great margin as compared to bids. If bidders 
realize that they underestimated their opportunity cost, they may have increased probability to 
violate the terms of the contract.  This is particularly important due to incomplete monitoring 
associated with most conservation management programs. The N+1price design has an advantage 
in this regard because of the information rent that winner bidders enjoy. 
 
One way to partly safeguard against noncompliance is to set the penalty sufficiently high.  Recall 
that N+1 price auction lead to truthful bidding, i.e. bids reveal the forest owners’ opportunity costs 
of conservation. Hence, the N+1 price bid can be used to set the penalty for non-compliance. For 
example, Romstad and Alfnes (2011) suggest to set the penalty, S = a p bN+1, where p is the 
monitoring probability, bN+1, is the first non-winning bid, and a > 1 is an adjustment factor that 
allows for periodic timber price fluctuations so that the expected profits of compliance exceeds the 






Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Summary and conclusion 
 
This study aimed to explore through a decision analysis the impact of uncertain timber prices and 
flexible harvesting on bid formation in N+1 price forest biodiversity auction.  The specific 
objectives were; to explore how timber prices uncertainty affects agents bid formation in N+1 price 
forest biodiversity auction and to explore its implications for other relevant aspects of N+1 auction 
design and implementation.  
 
Based on the price search model proposed by Brazee & Mendelsohn (1988) the analysis 
demonstrates that price uncertainty increases bids in conservation auctions. This is due to 
flexibility in timber harvesting and the occurrence of random price peaks over time, assuming the 
forest owner has no liquidity constraints. 
 
Implications for bidding behavior in conservation auction is that a rational bidder will submit 
higher bids under larger net price variability as compared to bids when less net price is less 
variable. 
 
At this point this hypothesis is not empirically tested due to the small number of conservation 
auctions undertaken. This can be an avenue for future research, but that requires one is able to find 
other auction settings that resemble conservation auctions. A possible solution for future research: 
A conservation contract is a restriction on the land use.  The ultimate land use restriction is to sell 
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